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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jose De Jesus Quezada appeals from the district court's dismissal, following an 
evidentiary hearing, of his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The factual background and procedural history of this case, as related by the 
district court, are as follows: 
On November 3, 2010, Bonneville County prosecutors charged 
Jose DeJesus Quezada, ("Petitioner"), with Stalking in the First degree 
after he entered a home with two juvenile girls under the age of sixteen. 
On March 9, 2011, Petitioner entered an A/ford11 plea to the charge of 
Burglary. At the Change of Plea Hearing, defense counsel told the Court 
that Petitioner's family had a history of mental illness and requested a 
mental evaluation prior to sentencing. The Court then ordered a §19-2524 
evaluation. 
On March 15, 2011, Daniel Hall ("Mr. Hall"), a mental health 
clinician for the State of Idaho, conducted the evaluation. Petitioner told 
Mr. Hall that he injured himself while in custody two months prior, but 
other than that he had no history of violence or mental illness. Mr. Hall 
reported that Petitioner would laugh at odd times and Petitioner said that 
he had uncontrolled thoughts in his head about sex, war, or vulgar 
language. Petitioner said that he did not believe that these thoughts were 
normal and he had noticed a change since he came to jail. Petitioner also 
told Mr. Hall that he believed his cellmates could read his thoughts. In his 
report, Mr. Hall opined that Petitioner was not capable of making informed 
treatment decisions for himself, but provided no opinion about Petitioner's 
mental competence as it pertains to proceedings. On May 19, 2011, the 
Court sentenced him to one year determinate and seven years 
indeterminate. On June 22, 2011, the Court modified the sentence 
pursuant to Rule 35 of I.C.R. and suspended the sentence and placed 
Petitioner on probation for five years. As a condition of probation, 
Petitioner was ordered to undergo substance abuse treatment and a 
mental health evaluation under I.C. § 19-2624 [sic], with the potential for 
mental health treatment. 
1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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On June 14, 2012, Petitioner filed a Verified Petition for Post-
conviction Relief. In his Petition, Petitioner asserts three causes of action. 
The first was ineffective assistance of counsel because defense counsel 
did not investigate Petitioner's schizophrenia. The second was that the 
Court erred in not ordering a competency hearing sua sponte and defense 
counsel was ineffective by not appealing the error. The third was that the 
conviction violated Petitioner's due process rights under the 14th 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution. He requests that the conviction be vacated. 
On December 6, 2012, a hearing was held on the State's Motion for 
Summary Dismissal, and Petitioner called Dr. Howard K. Harper ("Dr. 
Harper"). Dr. Harper previously submitted a report based on Mr. Hall's 
assessment of Petitioner. In that report, Dr. Harper reaffirmed the facts 
established by Mr. Hall and he gave the opinion that Petitioner was not 
competent at the time of the proceedings. Dr. Harper also stated that it 
was possible that the Court was not aware of Petitioner's mental state at 
the time of proceedings. During cross-examination, Dr. Harper affirmed 
that he never met with Petitioner, that this report was not a court-ordered§ 
18-211 mental competency evaluation to determine mental capacity, and 
that he had never done an §18-211 mental competency evaluation without 
meeting the defendant. Dr. Harper then testified that schizophrenia could 
come in episodes brought on by external stressors. He also testified that 
he never reviewed the transcripts from the Change of Plea Hearing and 
that his opinion was strictly confined to the information provided in Mr. 
Hall's evaluation. 
On August 28, 2013, the Court held an evidentiary hearing. At the 
hearing, Petitioner called defense counsel from the underlying case, 
McKay Hanks ("Mr. Hanks"). Mr. Hanks testified that he requested a 
mental evaluation and argued for mental health court at sentencing 
because of the strange facts of the case as well as Petitioner's family 
history of mental illness. However, Mr. Hanks testified that Petitioner 
understood the proceedings, provided adequate assistance to trial counsel 
during the proceedings and preparation, and gave no indication that he 
was incompetent. Mr. Hanks testified that while Petitioner sometimes 
acted odd, his behavior was largely normal and Petitioner gave Mr. Hanks 
no reason to doubt his capacity. Petitioner then called Mr. Hall to testify 
about the report he provided as a result of the court-ordered mental health 
evaluation. In his initial report Mr. Hall recommended out-patient 
treatment, but testified at the hearing that Petitioner's mental illness was a 
level where either out-patient or in-patient may be appropriate. Petitioner 
then called Dr. Harper for a second time. He testified that although an 
individual may be mentally ill, they are not necessarily incompetent. Dr. 
Harper provided no further information. 
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(R, pp.123-125.) 
After the evidentiary hearing, the district court entered an opinion and order 
denying Quezada's petition for post-conviction relief, and a judgment dismissing the 
petition. (R., pp.123-133.) Quezada filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.134-136.) 
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ISSUE 
Quezada states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when, following an evidentiary hearing at which 
the evidence establishing deficient performance and prejudice was 
uncontroverted, it denied Mr. Quezada post-conviction relief on his claim 
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel relating to his Alford 
plea when his attorney failed to advise him that the symptoms of his 
schizophrenia would have provided a plausible defense that he did not 
have the requisite mental state to be guilty of burglary or felony stalking? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Quezada failed to show error in the district court's denial of his petition for 
post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing? 
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ARGUMENT 
Quezada Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial Of His Petition For 
Post-Conviction Relief Following An Evidentiary Hearing 
A. Introduction 
Quezada filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, claiming, inter alia, that his 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and advise him prior to his Alford 
plea of guilt that his symptoms of schizophrenia could provide a defense to the 
"requisite specific intent to be guilty of stalking or burglary. "2 (Appellant's Brief, p.5 
(capitalization modified).) At the evidentiary hearing, Quezada presented evidence 
supporting claims that his trial counsel failed to investigate whether he was competent 
to stand trial, and failed to request a competency hearing. (R. pp.123-133.) The district 
court's written opinion and order denying Quezada's request for post-conviction relief 
addressed only the claims on which Quezada presented evidence at the evidentiary 
hearing and did not address his claim that trial counsel failed to investigate and advise 
him his mental condition could negate mens rea. (Id.) The court also, however, took 
judicial notice of "[e]verything in the current file and the underlying file." (R., pp.120-
2 Burglary is defined, in relevant part, as the entry into "any house, room ... with intent 
to commit any theft or any felony[.]" I.C. § 18-1401. The Amended Information to which 
Quezada pied guilty stated he "entered a room with the intent to commit any theft or any 
felony." (Clerks Exhibits, St. Ex. 1.) 
Under I.C. §§ 18-7905(1)(c) and 18-7906(1)(a), a person commits stalking in the 
first degree when the victim is under the age of sixteen and the defendant "knowingly 
and maliciously ... [e]ngages in a course of conduct that seriously alarms, annoys or 
harasses the victim and is such as would cause a reasonable person substantial 
emotional distress[.]" "'[M]aliciously' ... import[s] a wish to vex, annoy, or injure another 
person, or an intent to do a wrongful act[.]" I.C. § 18-101 (4). "'[K]nowingly' ... imports 
only a knowledge that the facts exist which bring the act or omission within the 
provisions of this code. It does not require any knowledge of the unlawfulness of such 
act or omission." I.C. § 18-101 (5). 
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121.) On appeal, Quezada contends his case must be remanded for a new trial 
because the state did not rebut the judicially noticed averments he made in his verified 
petition concerning his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for not informing him 
he had a defense based on a lack of specific intent. (Appellant's Brief, pp.4-17.) 
Regardless of whether the state specifically countered Quezada's mens rea 
claim at the evidentiary hearing, the district court was free to decide whether Quezada 
presented credible evidence to support his claim. Because Quezada fails to show clear 
error in the district court's implicit finding that his claim lacked credibility, he has failed to 
show error in the court's denial of his claim. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Applications for post-conviction relief under the UPCPA initiate civil proceedings 
in which, like a civil plaintiff, the applicant must prove his or her allegations by a 
preponderance of the evidence." McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 
703 (2010) (citing Hauschulz v. State, 144 Idaho 834, 838, 172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007); 
I.C.R. 57(c)). 
When the district court conducts an evidentiary hearing and enters findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only if they 
are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of law drawn by the district 
court from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730 
(1998). A trial court's decision that a post-conviction petitioner has not met his burden 
of proof is entitled to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 
965 (Ct. App. 1990). 
The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the 
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inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the province of 
the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 
2003). 
C. The District Court Correctly Denied Quezada's Post-Conviction Relief Petition 
Where the petitioner alleges entitlement to relief based upon ineffective 
assistance of counsel, he must demonstrate that his attorney's performance was 
objectively deficient and that he was prejudiced by that deficiency. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760-61, 760 
P.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1988). To establish deficient performance, the petitioner must 
"overcome the strong presumption that counsel's performance was adequate by 
demonstrating 'that counsel's representation did not meet objective standards of 
competence."' Vick v. State, 131 Idaho 121,124,952 P.2d 1257, 1260 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(quoting Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 648-49, 873 P.2d 898, 902-03 (Ct. App. 
1994)). Appellate courts "will not second guess counsel without evidence of inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective 
evaluation." State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466, 469-470, 816 P.2d 1023, 1026-27 (Ct. 
App. 1991) (citations omitted). When the alleged deficiency involves counsel's advice in 
relation to a guilty plea, "in order to satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the defendant 
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would 
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 
U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (footnote and citations omitted). "Moreover, to obtain relief on this 
type of claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea 
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bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 
U.S. 356, 372 (2010) (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)). 
The district court denied Quezada's petition for post-conviction relief in its 
entirety. (R., pp.123-133.) Appellate courts will "give due deference to any implicit 
findings of the trial court supported by substantial evidence." State v. Yeager, 139 
Idaho 680, 684, 85 P.3d 656,660 (2004) (citing State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 552-53, 
961 P.2d 641, 643-44 (1998); State v. Whiteley, 124 Idaho 261, 268, 858 P.2d 800, 807 
(Ct. App. 1993) ("Where explicit factual findings have not been made, we extrapolate 
the implicit findings of fact from the record and will uphold those if they are supported by 
substantial, competent evidence"); State v. Middleton, 114 Idaho 377, 380, 757 P.2d 
240, 243 (Ct. App. 1988) (the appellate court should examine the record to determine 
the "implicit" findings which underlie the judge's order). Because the averments in 
Quezada's petition do not provide sufficient evidence to prove his claim that counsel 
should have pursued a defense based on mental illness, Quezada has failed to show 
error in the denial of this claim. 
Nowhere in Quezada's verified post-conviction petition (R., pp.60-70) or post-
conviction counsel's affidavit (R., pp.7-59) does Quezada provide any discernible 
scientific or medical opinion to support his foundational claim that schizophrenia can 
adversely impact a person's ability to form the requisite mens rea of a crime. (See 
generally 12/6/12 Tr. and 8/28/13 Tr.) Quezada's apparent argument on appeal, that 
the district court was obligated to find, as credible, Quezada's own statement that "he 
lacked the requisite specific intent to be guilty of stalking or burglary" (R., p.67 
(capitalization modified)) is incorrect. The district court was entitled to implicitly find, by 
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virtue of its denial of Quezada's petition, that his statement lacked credibility and weight. 
See Peterson, 139 Idaho at 97, 73 P.3d at 110. Absent any credible evidence that his 
mental condition could have had any adverse impact on his ability to form the requisite 
mens rea for conviction of the crime, Quezada failed to establish his trial counsel's 
performance was deficient, much less prejudicial, under Strickland. 
Even if Quezada had presented credible evidence that his mental condition could 
have negated his ability to form the mens rea of burglary and felony stalking, his claim 
still fails. It is well-established that "[a] fair assessment of attorney performance 
requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight ... and 
to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." Maxfield v. State, 108 
Idaho 493, 700 P.2d 115 (Ct. App. 1985) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688) (ellipses 
original)). Assuming, arguendo, that Quezada's trial counsel, Mackay Hanks ("Hanks"), 
did not inform him that his mental condition could negate the mens rea element of the 
crime, Quezada failed to show that Hanks should have reasonably known his mental 
condition warranted such advice. 
The record supports the district court's implicit finding that Quezada failed to 
prove Hanks had any reason to suspect that Quezada's mental condition might negate 
mens rea. At the end of the entry of plea hearing, Hanks requested a mental health 
evaluation for sentencing purposes, explaining that Quezada's twin brother had recently 
been diagnosed with schizophrenia, and "[t]here are indications of some mental health 
issues with [Quezada's] behavior." (R., p.37 [Tr., p.20, Ls.13-17].) The subsequent 
mental health evaluation, conducted pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524, diagnosed Quezada as 
having "Schizophrenia, Undifferentiated Type." (R., p.13.) However, Hanks did not 
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have the benefit of that evaluation before or at the time Quezada entered his guilty 
plea.3 Moreover, Quezada presented no evidence he was suffering from schizophrenia 
the time of the crime, or that, even if he was, such would in any way negate a finding 
of mens rea. 
In short, the only evidence presented that was relevant to determining whether 
Hanks had reason to believe Quezada's- mental condition could negate the mens rea 
element of the crime was Hanks' own testimony during the post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing. He testified that, prior to Quezada entering a guilty plea, he observed or was 
aware of the following: 
(1) The behavior Quezada was accused of was strange (8/28/13 Tr., 
p.9, Ls.6-7); 
(2) Quezada's sister informed him that Quezada's twin brother had 
schizophrenia (8/28/13 Tr., p.9, Ls.7-10); 
(3) Although Quezada occasionally displayed a "little bit of odd 
behavior," nothing raised an alarm (8/28/13 Tr., p.9, Ls.7-12); 
(4) Quezada laughed at inappropriate moments "[m]aybe ... once or 
twice" (8/28/13 Tr., p.9, Ls.15-19); and 
(5) Although counsel knew Quezada had some mental health issues, 
he did not "know how deep it was going" (8/28/13 Tr., p.21, Ls.5-
8).4 
The above-described information comprised, in essence, the only facts known by Hanks 
suggesting Quezada may have had mental issues -- before and up to the time Quezada 
entered his guilty plea to burglary. While those factors may have indicated to Hanks 
3 Quezada has not alleged his trial counsel was ineffective for not seeking to withdraw 
Quezada's guilty plea after receiving the mental health evaluation. 
4 During the entry of plea hearing, the district court asked Quezada whether he had 
"any psychological or mental problems which might have a bearing on your case?" and 
he answered, "No." (R., p.34 [Tr., p.10, Ls.13-18].) 
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that Quezada had "some mental health issues," they did not suggest Quezada's mental 
condition was severe enough to negate his ability to form the mens rea necessary to be 
convicted of burglary or felony stalking. 
To the contrary, Hanks testified: 
(1) Quezada appeared to understand their conversations and what 
was happening, and provided helpful information (8/28/13 Tr., p.10, 
Ls.17-25); 
(2) Quezada understood what he was charged with and the likely 
consequences of pleading guilty to burglary (8/28/13 Tr., p.12, 
Ls.11-21); 
(3) Quezada did not talk to himself (8/28/13 Tr., p.9, Ls.13-14); 
(4) Counsel had no indication that Quezada did not understand the 
legal process or the roles of the court and parties (8/28/13 Tr., p.12, 
L.22- p.13, L.11); 
(5) Quezada was able to provide sufficient information in order to 
assist counsel in preparing for his defense (8/28/13 Tr., p.13, Ls.13-
16); 
(6). Counsel had no indication "at all" that Quezada may not have been 
competent under I.C. §§ 18-210, 18-211 (8/28/13 Tr., p.17, Ls.17-
21 ); 
(7) During the change of plea hearing, counsel did not recall Quezada 
laughing inappropriately, saying inappropriate things, or acting "as if 
he was responding to voices that were unheard by others in the 
courtroom" (8/28/13 Tr., p.18, Ls.14-25); and 
(8) If counsel believed Quezada had "any psychological or mental 
problems that would have a bearing on his case, his ability to plead 
guilty," he would have said something at that point (8/28/13 Tr., 
p.19, Ls.5-12). 
Considering the information known to him at the time of Quezada's guilty plea, Hanks 
reasonably requested, at the end of the entry of plea hearing, a mental health 
evaluation of Quezada to assist the court and parties at sentencing. 
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However, Hank's belief that Quezada had mental problems because he laughed 
inappropriately a couple of times, seemed a "bit odd," and his crime involved "strange" 
behavior, does not show Hanks was deficient for not being prescient enough to realize 
Quezada was schizophrenic or that his mental condition could have negated the 
requisite mens rea. See Vick, 131 Idaho at 124, 952 P.2d at 1260 (quoting Roman, 125 
Idaho at 648-49, 873 P.2d at 902-03) ("There is a strong presumption that counsel's 
performance falls within the wide range of professional assistance, and the defendant 
bears the burden of proving that counsel's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness.")). Based on all -- and only -- the information known to 
Hanks at the time of the plea hearing, Quezada has failed to demonstrate Hanks was 
deficient for failing to advise him he could overcome the mens rea element of the crime 
if he went to trial. 
Quezada also failed to demonstrate any prejudice with regard to his claim. He 
has failed to demonstrate that, "but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded 
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial," Hill, 474 U.S. at 58, or that "a decision 
to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." Padilla, 
559 U.S. at 372. The terms of the plea agreement in this case are set forth in the 
record: Quezada agreed to plead guilty to the amended charge of burglary in exchange 
for dismissal of a misdemeanor and the state's recommendation that he serve "a 120-
day local incarceration with a release to felony probation at the end of that." (R., p.33 
[Tr., p.7, Ls.7-14].) All the other aspects of sentencing were left open for argument. 
(R., p.33 [Tr., p.7, Ls.15-17].) On the surface of the plea agreement, Quezada was 
given an attractive offer of entering an Alford guilty plea (i.e., without actually admitting 
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the factual basis of his crime) to a crime (burglary) that involved much less stigma than 
the original charge (first degree stalking of a child under 16), with a recommendation by 
the state that he be serve local jail time, be placed on probation and have a 
misdemeanor dismissed. 
As discussed above, Quezada failed to present any credible evidence that his 
mental condition could have any adverse impact on his ability to form the mens rea 
required for conviction, much less that it would have had a viable chance of totally 
defeating the mens rea element of his crime at trial. Accordingly, Quezada failed to 
show that, absent counsel's alleged deficient performance, he would have made a 
rational decision by rejecting the favorable plea bargain and would have insisted on 
going to trial. Inasmuch as Quezada has failed to demonstrate his trial counsel's 
performance was prejudicial under Strickland, he has failed to show the district court 
erred by denying his claim. The district court's order, denying Quezada's post-
conviction petition following an evidentiary hearing, should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's opinion 
and order, following an evidentiary hearing, denying Quezada's petition for post-
conviction relief. 
DATED this 28 th day of August, 2014. 
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